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 Interest of the Amicus 
 Physician Hospitals of America (“PHA”) is a 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(6) 
organization formed to educate members of the physician-owned hospital 
community about regulatory and legislative issues and to encourage PHA 
members to advocate for the rights of physician-owned hospitals.  PHA has 
approximately 166 member hospitals in 34 different states, comprising both 
existing facilities and physician-owned hospitals in various stages of 
development.  PHA-member hospitals are typically enrolled as providers 
under Medicare and Medicaid programs, with up to 70% of their case mix 
stemming from Medicare and Medicaid patients.  The physician owners of 
PHA-member hospitals are also providers under Medicare and Medicaid. 
 PHA is committed to the sanctity of private property as guaranteed by 
the Constitution, especially the rights of physicians to own and operate 
hospitals and to provide patients with expert, cost-effective, and efficient 
health care.  PHA contends that § 6001 of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act of 2010 (“PPACA”), Pub L. No. 11-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010), retroactively prohibits planned, approved, and commenced facility 
expansion at approximately 58 Medicare-certified hospitals solely because 
they are owned by physicians, and further prevents the development of an 
additional 84 physician-owned hospitals that would be otherwise eligible for 
 1
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 Medicare certification.  See Physician Hospitals of America, et al. v. 
Sebelius, Case No. 6:10-cv-00277-MHS, filed June 3, 2010, in the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Tyler Division.  
 PHA has an interest in protecting its members directly, and the public 
indirectly, from any unconstitutional healthcare legislation, and thus it has 
an interest in supporting the Appellees in this action.  PHA’s membership is 
further harmed each day this litigation continues.  PHA’s members are 
American citizens who wish to invest their personal capital to expand their 
businesses, create jobs, and serve the public. They are prevented from doing 
so by the specter of an ultra vires act of Congress.   
 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(a), amicus curiae 
certifies that counsel for the Department of Justice on behalf of the 
Department of Health and Social Services for Appellants, counsel for the 
States-Appellees, and counsel for the Private Plaintiffs-Appellees, have 
consented to the filing of this brief.  This brief amicus curiae was written 
entirely by PHA’s counsel, and no person apart from those identified in 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(c)(5)(C) made a monetary 
contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief.   
 2
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 Argument 
 PHA agrees with the district court and the States that § 1501 of 
PPACA exceeds Congress’ authority to regulate interstate commerce.  
Granting the unconstitutionality of that section of the Act for the sake of 
argument, PHA focuses here on the district court’s ruling on severability.  
For the reasons set forth below, PHA urges this Court to affirm the district 
court’s declaration that PPACA is unconstitutional in its entirety.  
I. The District Court’s Ruling on Severance Was Correct. 
Having concluded that the individual mandate was invalid, the district 
court had three logically possible choices: sever § 1501 from the whole and 
strike it alone, strike more than just § 1501 by parsing through the statute to 
determine severance on a provision-by-provision basis, or refuse to sever 
§ 1501 and strike the statute in its entirety.  The court made the only 
constitutionally defensible choice consistent with Congressional intent in 
declaring PPACA unconstitutional in its entirety. 
A. Congress Did Not Intend Section 1501 To Be Severed From 
PPACA’s Remaining Provisions. 
 No party before this Court is arguing that the district court should 
have severed only § 1501 from PPACA.  Applicable case law and the text of 
the Act itself demonstrate why it would be wholly improper to sever only 
§ 1501.  First, Supreme Court precedent requires that, for severance to be 
 3
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 defensible, the remaining provisions of the law must remain “fully operative 
as a law” absent the invalid provision.  Free Enter. Fund v. Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S.Ct. 3138, 3161 (2010).  In making this 
determination, courts consider whether the remaining statutory provisions 
“will function in a manner consistent with the intent of Congress.”  Alaska 
Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1987).   
Here, no one contends that a PPACA without an individual insurance 
mandate would “function in a manner consistent with the intent of 
Congress” because it is accepted that a “health insurance market could never 
survive or even form if people could buy their insurance on the way to the 
hospital,” and Congress knew this when creating PPACA.  See Appellant’s 
Br. at 36 (citing 47 Million and Counting, 110th Cong. 52 (Hall).   
Second, § 1501 expressly identifies the centrality of the Individual 
Mandate to PPACA’s other provisions, stating: 
[I]f there were no requirement [to purchase health insurance], 
many individuals would wait to purchase health insurance until 
they needed care.  By significantly increasing health insurance 
coverage, the requirement, together with the other provisions of 
this Act, will minimize this adverse selection and broaden the 
health insurance risk pool to include healthy individuals, which 
will lower health insurance premiums.  The requirement is 
essential to creating effective health insurance markets … . 
Pub. L. 111-148 § 1501 (a)(2)(G), 124 Stat. 119, 243 (2010) (emphasis 
added).  In light of Congress’s own statement that the Individual Mandate is 
 4
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 an essential piece of an intentionally bundled-together group of provisions, 
there is no basis to conclude that Congress intended the residual of PPACA 
to survive if only § 1501 were stricken as unconstitutional.  Thus, a decision 
to sever only § 1501 from PPACA would conflict with Supreme Court 
authority on severance as well as evidence of Congress’s intent in enacting 
PPACA as a complete package.   
B. Striking More Than Just § 1501 but Not the Whole Statute Is 
Neither Legally Permissible Nor Even Feasible. 
It is conceivable that other severance cases involved statutes that 
accommodated an easy “save this, strike that” approach to severance: 
PPACA is simply not in that category.  Section 1501 itself is a linchpin 
provision of an Act that involved a delicate and opaque balancing of 
interests among members of Congress, who passed the statute by the 
slimmest of majorities.  It would be, therefore, an improvident project for 
any court to guess at which provisions were not part of an unrecorded quid 
pro quo that enabled the statute as a whole to pass through Congress.  
Moreover, the proper inquiry is not whether any residual provision could 
stand on its own, but rather whether the residual “will function in a manner 
consistent with the intent of Congress.”  Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684-85.  
Because Congress has not made a practice of creating a record that might 
inform a court about what various constellations of potentially residual 
 5
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 provisions would function in a manner consistent with its intent, any court’s 
warrant to cobble together some-but-not-other of PPACA’s provisions 
would necessarily rely on the most speculative evidence.  Further, as argued 
above, that approach would contradict the Act’s plain statement that § 1501 
was enacted to function “together with the other provisions of this Act.”  
Pub. L. 111-148 § 1501 (a)(2)(G), 124 Stat. 119, 243 (2010). 
As both Appellants and two district courts that have considered this 
question have recognized, parsing through PPACA’s residual provisions 
with the aim of determining which subset “will function in a manner 
consistent with [Congress’s] intent” would require the courts to do nothing 
less than unscramble the legislative omelet.  See Florida v. U. S. Dept. of 
Health and Human Svcs., No. 3:10-cv-91, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822 at 
*132 (N.D. Fl. Jan. 31, 2011 )(“Severing the individual mandate from the 
Act along with the other insurance reform provisions -- and in the process 
reconfiguring an exceedingly lengthy and comprehensive legislative scheme 
-- cannot be done.”); Virginia v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d. 768, 790 (E.D. 
Va. 2010)(“It would be virtually impossible within the present record to 
determine whether Congress would have passed this bill, encompassing a 
wide variety of topics related and unrelated to heath care, without Section 
1501.”).  Furthermore, this Court has several times declined the invitation to 
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 usurp the legislature’s role and rewrite a statute in order to save it.  See, e.g., 
Fla. Right to Life, Inc. v. Lamar, 273 F.3d 1318, 1326 (11th Cir. 2001)(“We 
will not, however, rewrite the clear terms of a statute in order to reject a 
facial challenge.”); Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 976 (11th Cir. 
2000)(“[T]he role of the judicial branch is to apply statutory language, not to 
rewrite it.”).    
 As this Court has recognized, rewriting a statute in order to salvage it 
usurps the legislative function.  See Harris, 216 F.3d at 976.  Not only 
would a “parsing” approach to severance revise statutory law without 
conforming to Constitutional requirements of bicameralism and 
presentment, but it would also encourage Congress to rely on the judicial 
branch to wield the equivalent of a line-item veto in the guise of 
“severance.”  As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, our Constitutional 
procedures for enacting statutes “were the product of the great debates and 
compromises that produced the Constitution itself.  Familiar historical 
materials provide abundant support for the conclusion that the power to 
enact statutes may only be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought 
and exhaustively considered, procedure.”  Clinton v. City of New York, 524 
U.S. 417, 439-440 (1998).  The procedure the government proposes for the 
scope of severance here has none of those qualities.   
 7
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 II. Declaring PPACA Unconstitutional as a Whole Is the Only Legally 
Defensible Decision. 
Any suggestion that Congress believed itself to be on solid 
constitutional footing when enacting the individual mandate of § 1501 could 
not be said with a straight face.  Not only did Congress build in a judicial 
review period by making § 1501 effective in 2014, but its legal researchers 
also unambiguously foretold that the mandate faced an uncertain future in 
the courts.  See Florida, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *71 (noting that 
“Congress’ attorneys in the Congressional Research Service (‘CRS’) and 
Congressional Budget Office (‘CBO’) advised long before the Act was 
passed into law, that the notion of Congress having the power under the 
Commerce Clause to directly impose an individual mandate to purchase 
health care insurance is ‘novel’ and ‘unprecedented.’”)(further citation 
omitted). 
With and despite this apparent knowledge, Congress elected not to 
guide the federal courts’ decision as to severance by including a severability 
provision.  It is difficult to view those facts in combination and not conclude 
that Congress opted either to risk the viability of the Act as a whole, or to 
prompt a judicial determination of what provisions it intended to link to the 
individual mandate.  If the former is true, then the government must live 
with the consequence of that decision and accept that PPACA must fail as a 
 8
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 whole.  If the latter is true, this Court should decline the invitation to make 
hard choices that Congress declined to make for itself using only guesswork 
as to Congressional intent with respect to a mish-mosh statute. 
In the usual case where Congress includes a severability clause or 
provision, the courts apply a presumption of severability.  Alaska Airlines, 
480 U.S. at 686.  PPACA, however, lacks a severability provision, so there 
is no such presumption.  Id.  Moreover, not only did Congress fail to include 
a severability provision, but the statute’s legislative history indicates that this 
failure was intentional because an earlier version of the Act included a 
severability clause.  See H.R. 3962, section 255.  “Where Congress includes 
[express] language in an earlier version of a bill but deletes it prior to 
enactment, it may be presumed that the [omitted provision] was not 
intended.”  Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23-24 (1983).  Thus, 
where normally Congress’s failure to include a severability clause is 
perceived as mere Congressional “silence” on the subject, see Alaska 
Airlines, 480 U.S. at 686, here the Court may consider the Congressional 
decision to exclude a severability clause as evidence of Congressional intent 
that PPACA should stand or fall as a whole on the constitutionality of its 
core provisions.   
 9
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  Accordingly, because the record does not show that the remaining 
provisions of PPACA were intended to be “fully operative as a law” absent 
the Individual Mandate, and it is not “evident” that Congress would have 
enacted PPACA’s remaining provisions independent of its unconstitutional 
package of wide-ranging health-care industry reforms, the only proper 
approach here is to strike the statute in its entirety.  See Free Enter. Fund, 
130 S. Ct. at 3161. 
III. The Government’s Approach to Severence is Unprecedented and 
Would Create an Unworkable Patchwork of Uncertain Non-severed 
Provisions by District and Circuit. 
For the first time in this case, the government argues that a two-stage 
process should guide the scope of PPACA’s severance.  In stage one, the 
district court would determine which PPACA provisions “burden parties to 
the litigation,” because the government contends that only those provisions 
even qualify for severance consideration.  Appellant’s Br. at 59-60.  None of 
the Supreme Court’s seminal cases on severance–Alaska Airlines, Free 
Enterprise Fund, or Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood, 546 U.S. 320 (2006)–
contemplate this approach.  This idea is manufactured from dicta in Printz v. 
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), a case that cursorily considered the 
scope of severance with respect to a state statute.  
 10
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 The government further asserts that this preliminary determination of 
what provisions would qualify for severance consideration could exclude 
even provisions integrally related to an unconstitutional provision.  
Appellant’s Br. at 59 (“Moreover, even when particular provisions are 
integrally related, a court may not address provisions that do not burden 
parties to the litigation.”).  That extreme argument is made not only without 
any authority but also in contravention of existing authority.  Specifically, in 
Free Enterprise Fund, the Supreme Court instructed that courts should be 
guided in their severance determinations by evidence from the Legislature 
that certain provisions would not have been enacted independent of the 
unconstitutional provision.  130 S.Ct. at 3161.  This can only mean that any 
provision “integrally related” to an unconstitutional provision should be 
subject to severance, because such provisions “would not have been enacted 
independent of the unconstitutional provision.”  Id.  Thus, the government’s 
suggested approach ignores binding authority. 
 In the second stage of the government’s hoped-for process, district 
courts would engage in “a close analysis of Congressional intent” to 
determine whether the however-many remaining provisions that do burden 
the parties and are otherwise “unobjectionable” were intended by Congress 
 11
Case: 11-11021     Date Filed: 05/12/2011     Page: 15 of 19
 to “stand alone and function independently.*  Appellant’s Br. at 57.  
Notably, the government declines to identify to this Court exactly which 
provisions of PPACA even arguably meet those criteria. 
 If the government’s approach were adopted, federal courts would be 
making at least two determinations to define the proper scope of severance: 
first as to provisions that burden the parties, second as to Congressional 
intent regarding the independent functionality of the residual.  That approach 
to severance would practically guarantee the creation of very different 
PPACA rump statutes by district and circuit.  Until the Supreme Court 
would settle the severance question with finality, the country would have to 
suffer an unmanageable and uncertain hodge-podge of differing—and 
costly—provisions.  The government does not make this result clear, but it is 
foreseeable, and gives this Court ample reason to reject that approach. 
Conclusion 
 The court below properly entered judgment declaring PPACA 
unconstitutional and void in its entirety.  In so doing, the court avoided the 
pitfalls of producing hybrid legislation which does violence to the separation 
                                                 
* There is no authority cited to illuminate what constitutes an “unobjectionable” provision 
as used in Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984).  If this Court were to order 
remand and an evaluation of severance on a provision-by-provision basis, due process 
would entitle PHA and other affected persons to a hearing on their objections to 
constitutionally infirm provision of PPACA before the court determines that any 
individual section is “unobjectionable” and therefore not subject to severance. 
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 of powers and fails to accomplish stated congressional purposes.  For these 
reasons, your amicus urges the Court to affirm the judgment of the district 
court, nullify PPACA in its entirety, and prohibit its enforcement. 
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